The Importance of Icebreakers and “Polar” Power Projection
We recently discussed icebreakers in some detail, these large, specialised ships that enable a state to assert dominance and influence in the polar regions, facilitating navigation through thick, multi-year ice in both the Arctic and Antarctic. This article, part of what we’d like to call “the icebreaker series,” aims to explore the state of the most relevant Arctic nations’ icebreaker fleets, assessing their current status, historical context and future possible development plans. We pick up where our previous discussion left off, turning our focus back to the United States; a global Superpower, yet, rather “mysteriously,” one still far from real Arctic dominance.
As the Arctic becomes warmer and increasingly accessible due to climate change, the interests of both smaller and larger Powers grow intertwined, drawn by the region’s valuable resources and emerging trade routes. Yet the Arctic remains extreme, inhospitable and challenging to inhabit. And this is unlikely to change anytime soon. Despite these difficulties, the region’s development is essential. Human ingenuity has conceived ways to overcome the Arctic’s logistical challenges, building infrastructure and supply chains that often stretch for thousands of kilometres.
Transport by lorry is unfeasible on ground that’s frozen and wind-lashed in winter, then turns swampy in summer, where, understandably, roads deteriorate rapidly. Rail transport is also ruled out, with temperatures too severe and distances to major urban centres (especially across the Asian and American Arctic) too vast. Air transport, meanwhile, is impractical for moving the heavy tonnage of raw materials to processing facilities due to prohibitive costs and inefficiencies. There are several settlements and even cities scattered across the Arctic, home to communities – roughly four million people live there – that still depend on such a fragile network of roads and air connections for essential supplies and services.
This is where icebreakers come indispensable. By clearing paths through the ice, they enable the passage of tankers loaded with energy resources, supplies, consumer goods and even tourists. We’d like to make a small remark: contrary to popular belief, icebreakers don’t “cut” through the ice like a knife through butter. Rather, they are designed to ride up onto the ice, breaking it beneath them under their own weight, with the force of gravity doing the heavy lifting.
The Limited Capability of the US Icebreaker Fleet
Returning to the situation in the US Arctic, we find a sparsely populated area with resources so difficult to access that large investments are currently hard to justify. Approximately only 50,000 people live in the US Arctic (the smallest share among all of the Arctic nations), while the territory formally considered to be Arctic by the US government is roughly the Northern third of the State of Alaska, therefore accounting for less than 6% of the total US land area. The US fleet of icebreakers today comprises only two vessels. This situation contrasts starkly with America’s broader military posture: a globally dominant Navy capable of projecting power to nearly any region of the world, despite the fact that US sovereignty technically extends only to its own territory. The US Navy may indeed be able to reach all “four corners” of the globe, but not the Arctic ice, where Russia dominates with its formidable fleet of over 40 icebreakers, including several nuclear-powered giants.
It has not always been this way. For the sake of accuracy, it must be noted that the US has historically been at the forefront of industrial power. World War II advanced the need for icebreakers, essential for reaching airbases in Greenland and Soviet ports in the North. By the 1950s, the US operated eight icebreakers, marking a significant presence in this domain. However, it is also true that the last US vessel designed for icebreaking was launched in 1999, over 25 years ago, and this was the Healy, which suffered a fire at the outset of its mission in August 2024.
While our focus is primarily on the Arctic, it is important to mention that of the two icebreakers currently in service with the US Coast Guard, only the Polar Star is a heavy icebreaker capable of navigating Antarctic waters to resupply the US McMurdo Station, the largest base on the Antarctic continent, which functions almost as a small city. Launched in 1976, the Polar Star spends most of its operational life in dry dock, undergoing repairs with parts scavenged – the technical term is “cannibalised” – from other now-defunct vessels of a similar class.
Future Plans and a Levitating Cost
Efforts to remedy the dire state of the fleet have been hesitant, with the most notable being the Polar Security Cutter Program. Both the US government and civil-military authorities recognise the necessity of this initiative: a fleet of icebreakers has become crucial due to the obsolescence of the two vessels still in operation, despite their operational limitations. In 2013, the federal budget included a plan for the construction of six new heavy icebreakers for the Coast Guard, with the first vessel, already named Polar Sentinel, originally scheduled for completion in 2024. However, the project has faced significant setbacks, including the bankruptcy of VT Halter Marine, the contractor awarded the project, which was later acquired by Bollinger Shipyards, who have since committed to moving the project forward.
The projected costs have exploded compared to initial estimates. The US Congress now anticipates approximately $5.1 billion for just three vessels, with costs likely to rise further. Additionally, the delivery timeline for the first ship has continually slipped, with estimates pushing completion to 2027, then 2028 and uncertainty looming even for a 2029 delivery. Furthermore, the signed ICE Pact among Finland, Canada and the US appears unlikely to bring in significant enhancements to the stagnant US fleet, which lags behind the more experienced industries of Russia and Finland in icebreaker technology.
But, perhaps, the most significant factor at play here is the apparent lack of strong political interest. This situation could be perceived as a postponement, an acceptance to the current state of affairs and a stubborn reluctance – rooted in national security concerns – to depend on external partners, even allies, for the construction of these vital vessels that are essential for maintaining a credible Arctic presence.
Yet, evidently, this does not align with the current priorities of the US government.
Tommaso Bontempi
Also read the publication:
The U.S. Wants & Wishes in the Arctic: Alliances, Arms Trade, Data Sharing
