The Kalix Line was a defensive zone in Sweden, located between the Torne and Kalix Rivers. It was designed to prevent or delay a potential Soviet invasion. Its construction began during the Second World War until the 1990s when it was dismantled. The Kalix line was not a single line but rather a zone of fortifications and military positions within the Kalix defense area. Fo 67. © Christopher Rehn
During the Cold War, Sweden put its heart, soul, and a lot of money, resources, and effort into building the most powerful defense line in the Arctic, the Kalix Line, where the Swedish military planned to stop the onslaught of the Soviet Army, which would have been trying to reach the Atlantic coast via Finland by the shortest route. The enemy from the East had however never showed up for the war, and the Kalix Line remained an expensive monument to flawed military-political scenarios and wrong decision-making.
The backbone of the Norrland brigades' anti-tank defense was the "Huggpipan", a 9 cm recoilless anti-tank piece. It was either wheel-mounted (as in the picture) or vehicle-mounted. © Lasse Sjögren/SMB
From the Stockholm area there is the old classic story of the muster officer who asks the muster: Can you ski? – Yes, answers the young man. Good, then it will be Boden, says the patternmaker, and calls out the next youngster with the question: Can you ski? – No, replies the young man. Good, you'll learn that in Boden, replied the patternmaker.
During the Cold War, about half a million Swedish conscripts were trained to protect the border in the east against a Soviet attack. The purpose of all the training, all the planning and all the preparation was to show the outside world that Sweden really meant the claims of our neutrality and that its defense was deterrence; the enemy would realize that the Swedish were so well prepared that it was not worth attacking them.
All society's resources within the transport, electricity and telecommunications network were integrated into the planning to secure a Swedish defense of upper Norrland. All government agencies, such as SJ, the Swedish Road Administration, Vattenfall and the Swedish Telecom Agency were involved, as well as the county council's healthcare resources and all municipal planning. The industry developed special systems such as Hägglund's tracked wagons, Scania's and Volvo's trucks and Bofor's artillery pieces. In all, a defense of Norrland was prepared with a maximum of 200,000 soldiers from most of Sweden's provinces.
On the way to defend upper Norrland. Almost half a million conscripts were trained to counter Soviet troops in the far north. © Lasse Sjögren/SMB
According to the generally accepted scenario, in the event of a Soviet attack on Sweden in the north, the superpower's real goal was to reach Norway's Atlantic coast. Former Commander-in-Chief Bengt Gustavsson put it this way:
"We could see (enemy's) three possible purposes. In addition to getting to Norway and protecting its own second-strike capability in Murmansk, the attacker could simultaneously threaten shipments from the United States to Europe. The third was about air defense. There could be a Soviet interest in preempting NATO and moving forward its aircraft and motorized military formations to Scandinavia to protect Moscow and the Leningrad area. Throughout the Cold War, naval supremacy in the Arctic Ocean was a priority goal of the Warsaw Pact. This included an attack on Northern Norway to occupy the Norwegian coast.”
If the Soviets attacked Norway at their common border north of Finland, the Norwegian defenses would delay the enemy at strategically important fjords. The large and deterrent defense was to take place at Lyngenställningen (originally built by the Germans) just north of the Swedish Treriksröset. The position was very strong and once the road along the mountain side was blown up any attempt at road construction or overshipping could be repelled by the defending Norwegian 6th Division.
Sten Ekman: “the Russians were not interested in occupying Norrbotten or Västerbotten. Their only goal was to get up to the northern Norwegian ports, including Narvik, and the airfields in the same area. It is highly inconceivable that the US would have allowed the Soviets to walk into such attractive things undisturbed. From Norway they would have had an easier time fighting materiel and troop transports over Atlantic."
The smoothest and shortest route for the Soviets to reach the Norwegian Atlantic coast was across Finland and Sweden, via Karesuando to Narvik, or south towards Arvidsjaur and west towards Mo i Rana.
An attack through Finland and Sweden would probably require eight to nine divisions, and the Soviet Union would need two to three months to transport troops and maintenance to their starting positions. Finland planned to stop an enemy advancing in the north at the Kemi River. Once mobilized, the defense and delay could operate for at least two weeks – if no resistance was made, the Soviet breakthrough could be accomplished in three days.
Against the background of Finland's special relationship with the Soviet Union (the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance after the Second World War), the Swedish military did not dare to assume that the country's leadership would defend itself against a Soviet attack in all situations. There was skepticism about certain parts of the Finnish action: Soviet trains could continue to the Swedish border without delaying reloading difficulties due to the same track gauge, and the Soviet owned petrol company Teboil had disproportionately large diesel and petrol stations along the east-west roads between the Russian and Swedish borders.
According to the war scenario, when the attacking Soviet troops reached Sweden, there would only be one road per advancing division in the first stage of attack. The Soviet advances were to be supplemented by air landings at the river crossings and at the Luleå and Gällivare airports.
The divisions' primary objective would be moving ten miles into Sweden after two to four days of attack, and the secondary objectives would be 15–22 miles advance into the country after five to ten days.
The terrain of the expected war scene in the far north is difficult to advancing troops. It consists of sparse forest, large and small lakes, vast marshlands and mountains, and there are hardly any roads here. After the dark and rainy autumn, a long, snowy winter follows, which can, however, allow progress in roadless terrain. Then the landscape is defoliated and the risk of detection and combat from airplanes and helicopters is greater; all tracks are visible in clear weather.
Skiing was an important part of the military exercises in Norrland. In the roadless terrain, it was often the fastest way to get around. © Sjöberg picture.
Sten Ekman: "There were always exercises in March. You would mainly do rehearsal exercises at this time of the year. Conducting a battle during the spring and summer was not so difficult, but they wanted to practice it in February–March when it was like damn it. No other place in the country has had major military training. Almost half of the enlisted guys from the Stockholm area had to go up to Boden, but we had good equipment, so the weather wasn't a big problem. And it was included in the training how to cope. Of course, not everything was included: for example, you could see how a man would break fresh tree branches trying to make a fire with, and no doubt he was a Stockholmer."
Skiers, however, could move faster using motorized equipment. A tractor towing a ski squad near Råneå, 1962. Photo: Försvarsmakten.
One way to delay and complicate an invasion is laying explosives under roads and at the roadsides. It is a defense strategy that has been central to the area since the 19th century. The picture was taken somewhere in Norrbotten, probably during the late 1970s. Photo: The Swedish Armed Forces/Ing 3
The main scenario that the Swedish military worked according to was that the Soviet Union would attack from Finland across the Torne river and into Norrland. The invasion forces would then, by means of very extensive road mining, be channeled to the five roads that led in a westerly direction from the border. There were well over half a million mines in the mobilization stockpiles, which enabled mining of 100 kilometers with a width of 10 meters. Then the enemy's advance would be slowed by road blasts. There were over 200 prepared road sites (see the photo above) with 300 kilos of TNT in each (the combined explosive power was equivalent to several medium nuclear bombs) and each road blast would take between three and five days to repair.
Sten Ekman: "If you look at the map here, there is one bridge in Övertorneå, one in Pello ... in total there are only six bridges in a stretch of 50 – 60 miles. So there are not many ways to get there with military vehicles. The same goes for roads: there are only five of them in the Kalix defense area – crooked, hilly, drawn over marshland – under which pipes were laid to be able to blow them up. In about two hundred sections of road, 16 pipes were buried which could be filled with 1,300 kilos of TNT. In this way, a 60 meter wide and three to four meter deep pothole in the road was obtained. It is a good way to, not stop, but slow down and delay the attack force. A mechanized Russian division had 3,000 wheeled vehicles, and if there is no road, they must stop and try to repair it. A tank, on the other hand, has caterpillar feet that allow it to sidestep the embankment blast; unless it's precisely marshland, then it sinks...". The Swedish built shelters of all sizes, from three-man to 48-man shelters, and they were scattered all the way between Torne and the Kalix river valleys. In total along the entire Kalix line there was room for around 18,000 men in shelters against heavy artillery fire. They formed kind of a "delay system", that is, the defender will not be able to stop a Russian invasion, but could delay the advance. In other words, there was never a thought to fight back the attacker directly at the border. There were two main strategic lines to fight on: Kalix line and Luleälvda line were of the "here but no further" type.
This is what a shelter for 10 people looked like in 1968. This exploded view shows the SK 10 KUPOL shelter. Photo: Fortifications Agency
The operational principle was based on three well-planned phases, first to meet the enemy, then to stop him and finally to beat him. An attacking Soviet enemy would thus be channeled along the east-west roads. He would be delayed and weakened by units grouped by the side of the roads to be worn out at the barriers and halted further on at some major river. The enemy troops would finally be cut to pieces by a concerted flank attack.
Almost all Swedish associations and abilities were included in the effort. In order to succeed against a Soviet attack in Norrland, Sweden's political leadership was prepared to transport up and deploy almost all units in Central Sweden, leaving only a screen of effective coastal artillery in Stockholm, an air defense over the Mälardalen and certain strategic reserves in Central Sweden and Scania.
The purpose of this phase was to gain time by delaying the Soviet troops at road and bridge blasts and at fixed roadblocks, as well as by attacking the clearing units and striking in depth against command and maintenance units.
More than a quarter of a century has passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But the memories of a geopolitical threat and the long-standing will to defend remain. Here are some of the very large amount of anti-tank obstacles that over the years have become part of the landscape. Photo: Sten Ekman.
The very well prepared delay area was the border zone between the Kalix River and the border rivers (Torne River and Muonio River) where four of the five east-west roads that the Soviet troops could use were located. Along the through roads, home defense and local defense units were grouped in extended redoubts, supported by anti-tank helicopter companies and other battle groups with very short mobilization times. The first to face the enemy would be the locally recruited border jaeger units, mobilized in Haparanda, Övertorneå, Pajala and Karesuando areas, with the task of blowing up the bridges at the border.
Between the roads, jaeger battalions from Norrlands Dragoons were grouped in Arvidsjaur. With the support of extensive road and bridge blasting and with field work and mining, the troops would delay the enemy's advance. They would then stay behind when the enemy moved past them and attack in the flanks to attack command posts, destroy fuel stores and key equipment, such as excavators and bulldozers.
The bridges over the Kalix river, like this one at Morjärv, were prepared to be blown up if the enemy came close. © Sten Ekman
“Fight in the depths of his area to make it difficult to repair, build and maintain connections, and to bring forward supplies”, stated Arméreglemente 2. Even the sandbanks took on an operational significance, since an attacking enemy would be dependent on access to large quantities of sand for his repair work of the blasted roads. Don't let a bastard cross the bridge! was the Sven Dufva-like defense motto to stop the enemy at the big rivers and secure Överkalix, Boden or, in the last resort, Älvsbyn.
Three battalions with fast- and long-firing 15.5 cm band guns were grouped west of the Kalixälven to be able to support the delay battle in the border zone and knock out the enemy's rear units. © The Swedish Armed Forces' image agency.
The intention of the stopping phase was to secure an area from which the enemy could be fought, as well as to channel their advance to certain lines until they reached the places where the Swedish defense wanted to stop them.
The rivers were defended in resistance areas with redoubts and road and bridge blasts by infantry brigades from I 14 in Gävle and I 13 in Falun which were grouped at the Kalix, Lule or Piteå rivers, depending on how far forward they managed. Virtually all Swedish infantry regiments had detached units that were to be transported to Norrland to support the defense.
The intention of the strike phase was to attack and cut off the enemy and break his resistance, either north towards Kiruna and Malmberget or south towards E4. Having secured a pivot at Överkalix, Boden, or Älvsbyn, and stopped the enemy at one of the larger rivers, the attacking force would be broken by flanking his soft parts, such as staff and rear support units, with one or two divisions consisting of modern Norrland brigades or transported armored brigades.
The task of the divisions was to first take terrain in the depth of the enemy grouping and then to attack and cut the enemy into smaller parts by striking his artillery and maintenance units. Experience from previous winter wars has shown that isolated units cannot survive many days without maintenance, support and replenishments.
The five Norrland brigades were well trained. They could advance over 20 miles over unpaved terrain with their fighting units before needing relief. All available modern long-range artillery was concentrated in upper Norrland in order to knock out the enemy's artillery and formations in depth.
A self-propelled howitzer takes part in a military unit exercise in the Kalixtrakten in 1974. Sten Ekman: "It was a unique piece, that one. There were only 26 pieces and all of them were placed in the Kalix line. When it arrived, it was the world's largest tracked artillery piece with its 53 tons. It could fire 14 shells in 45 seconds and thus lay a very effective artillery fire in a short time. © Sten Ekman.
If the defense had time to group before the enemy crossed the border, it would be stopped at the height of the Kalix river. If the defense was not ready, the enemy would be stopped somewhat further south at the Lule river, and in a third option the enemy would to be stopped at the Pite river. For these three different cases, a large number of attacks were planned, which would be triggered depending on the development of events.
In the event of a possible loss of Fyrkanten, retreat and recovery would take place towards Arvidsjaur and adjacent to Storuman, while the road towards Mo i Rana in Norway was important for possible reinforcements. Additional units or divisions from Central Sweden or Scania would strengthen the attack in one direction or the other.
If the Swedish leadership had ice in its stomach and lured the enemy far into the country, the chances of winning would have increased. By then the enemy's maintenance lines had become longer and his defense lines thinner. This gave greater freedom of action to, from protected grouping locations in the interior of Norrland, attack, divide and strike an advancing enemy at his weakest points – and thereby win.
In addition, the conditions for precision combating the advancing columns with attack aircraft would have been good, in the same way that NATO did in Operation Desert Storm during the Kuwait War.
The SK 60 training aircraft would provide air support to the army. Here, a plane is armed with 13.5 cm attack rockets m/70 in difficult weather. There were a total of 700 locations, so-called road bases, where Swedish fighter planes could land around Sweden, so it was impossible to destroy Swedish airpower.
The Swedish operational planning was similar to Napoleon's plan for the victory at Austerlitz in 1805, where Napoleon along the through route first secured a well-defended pivot at Santon, corresponding to Boden. Then Napoleon enticed the Austrians and Russians to attack by abandoning the important Pratzen Plateau (equivalent to the Quadrangle) and by withdrawing his troops to the west and south. He thereby caused the enemy to advance further south and to abandon the Pratzen Plateau, thanks to which he further thinned his defensive line. In rapid marches and entirely by stealth, Napoleon marshalled strong units from the south and retook the plateau in a powerful counterattack that divided the Austrians and Russians and forced them into the Telnitz Lakes, equivalent to the Gulf of Bothnia, where they surrendered.
Within the northern military areas (Uvre and Nedre Norrland) lived one million Swedes, i.e. one eighth of the population spread over half of Sweden's surface. Almost all of civil society's resources needed to be mobilized to support the nearly 200,000 soldiers who would defend the area. The defense was led by a military commander who was grouped with the civilian commander, who coordinated the community's medical, transportation, electrical and telecommunication resources so that the defense received maximum support and the community received maximum protection. The management took place from a rock room with good connection possibilities, first in Klinten in Boden, but later moved.
Gunners and loaders from I 19 in Boden practice with grenade launchers m/48 outside Boden in 1976. © The War Archive
All of society's available transport resources, such as SJ and SAS, were engaged to quickly get soldiers and equipment from Mälardalen to Norrland, a distance of over 100 kilometres. There were four roads, a railway line and a number of airports to use. The transport organization was developed. The total train capacity requirement amounted to a 50-mile long train route. In less than two weeks, nearly 200,000 men were to be transported up to the mobilization depots in Norrland and to the troop concentration zone.
Everything was thought out – the whole community was involved in the defense of Norrland.
The local voluntary organizations had a large presence in the border areas during the Cold War. In the photo, staff from Sweden's female car crews national association (SKBR), who were responsible for training female volunteers to drive various types of vehicles. The personnel were deployed either within the Home Guard, in the defense area staff or within certain parts of the defense area's units. Photo: The Swedish Armed Forces
There was not only a need for the transport of soldiers to the north. The hospitals were to be emptied and the patients moved south to ensure care places for the military, 5,000 in Norrbotten and 5,000 in Västerbotten. In lower Norrland there were another 7,500 nursing places for the military.
Almost all the buses were included in the planning to evacuate the civilian population and all the carriers and trucks were registered for transport and the construction companies were there to build fortifications. Retail businesses were included to secure food supplies with the support of extensive pre-storage of staple foods.
The last military exercises of the cold war on the Kalix line
Exercise Nordanvind 91 (North wind 91) took place for a week in the areas of Kiruna and Gällivare, at the same time as Operation Desert Storm was ongoing in Kuwait. One of the aims was to show the outside world Swedish ability to bring large combat forces to northern Sweden and thus also the will to defend this part of the country. 24,000 soldiers took part in the exercise in March 1991, along with 5,200 vehicles, 40 helicopters and 150 aircraft.
The final words of the military commander, Lieutenant General Curt Sjöö, to the participating units were: "The ground forces have marched up, conducted an attack and delay operation for five days and then regrouped. Both materials and personnel have proven to work well in winter conditions. The associations have essentially been able to solve their tasks."
Swedish war planning assumed a functioning infrastructure. The basic philosophy in the event of a Russian invasion can be said to have been this: move everything important inland, to the west. The picture shows the unloading of Bandwagon 202 from a railway wagon at Vännäs station in 1970. Photo: Försvarsmakten
Severin Boström was just one of roughly 300 communists, pacifists and radical social democrats who were interned in the labor camp in Storsien. Image from Nils Lundgren's film Upright! (2005). Photo: Nils Lundgren/Film i Västerbotten
Sten Ekman: "This was during the Second World War and only for a short period [1939-40]. It was about the guys who did military service – it was compulsory at the time – and who had more or less clear left-wing sympathies. These were not allowed access to weapons and were isolated. On very loose grounds, the Russian terror was widespread and great efforts were made to ensure that they could not spread their delusions further. Conscripts were also interned in other places in the country, so-called communist sympathizers."
The Siknäs battery was the most important on the Kalix line. The batteries were camouflaged with rock and netting to blend into the terrain. Töre harbor a few miles west of Kalix was protected by the battery, a four-story facility in the Norrbothnian primeval rock – and the only one of four cannon batteries that has been preserved completely intact to this day. © Sten Ekman
Sten Ekman: "The Siknäs battery consisted of eight heavy artillery pieces that had previously been on a Swedish armored ship. These guns could lay artillery fire over an invasion fleet towards Töre harbor but also over an advancing attacker who came on the E4 from Haparanda”.
The Kamlung battery can still be seen today. It consisted of two 15.2 cm guns from the battleship Gustaf V. © Janm67
Sten Ekman: "The Kalix line was one of all the investments in money and effort that Sweden made to try to avoid us being attacked and occupied by a foreign power. But now the defense plans have been sent to the archives. The entire Swedish total defense has been dismantled. Vehicles and military equipment of a very large scale have been sold or discarded. Fortifications have been demolished or sealed. But there are still hundreds of thousands of armored obstacles that would stop the Russian tanks and vehicles."
Based on: Forsvarsmakten, Popularhistoria (13.09.2022), Popularhistoria (17.07.2017)
Read more on the topic:
Sten Ekman. Född, uppvuxen och militärutbildad i Kalix. Författare till böckerna Kalixlinjen – Kalla krigets lås i norr (2013)
Sten Ekman. Sovjetiskt storanfall mot Norrbotten (2014).
The North Observer
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