The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO became a turning point marked the fragmentation of the Arctic into two camps: Russia versus NATO. This change will decisively impact on Arctic politics including issues of security and international cooperation. NATO's expansion at the expense of previously neutral Sweden and Finland had nothing to do with security issues in the Arctic. All regional disputes were resolved in accordance with international law. In the West, the decision to expand NATO was explained as a response to Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, which began in 2022. Although the roots of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict had no ties with the Arctic, Russia was accused of intending to use force in the Arctic in the future.
In fact the conditions for changing the military-strategic situation in the Arctic had been prepared by the collective West stealthily and long before the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine. The gradual involvement of Sweden and Finland took place through military-technical cooperation with the United States, which intensified immediately after the end of the Cold War. Both countries participated in NATO's Partnership for Peace program (started in 1994) designed as an adaptation mechanism for future NATO members, and in a number of other alliance programs. At the same time, NATO has consistently pursued a course of expansion beyond its geographic area of responsibility. As a result, the Swedish and Finnish armed forces adopted NATO weapons and standards, gained experience in operations (Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya) and gradually achieved interoperability with the alliance's forces. At the same time, Sweden and Finland officially claimed the policy of “military non-alignment”. Military cooperation deepened after Crimea's reunification with Russia in 2014, when Sweden and Finland became NATO associate members.
In order to provide the West with unilateral advantages, a number of bilateral security cooperation agreements were concluded even before the launch of the special military operation. Such a 10-year agreement was signed by the U.S. and Norway in June 2021 with the possible prolongation. According to the document, the U.S. at its own discretion can build the necessary infrastructure, deploy equipment, weapons, military and civilian personnel not only in the 4 sites specified in the document (Rygge, Sola, Evenes airbases; Ramsund naval base), but also in other places by mutual consensus [Defense Cooperation. Agreement Between the United States of America and Norway. Treaties and Other International Acts Series 22-617. P.10. Available at: State.gov (accessed: 02.04.2024)]. Mutual access to such sites is provided, but Norway has no right to control what the U.S. brings into the transferred military facilities. In addition, agreement allows exercises with the other NATO countries, the movement of U.S. forces and assets through Norwegian territory, refueling of aircrafts, use of seaports, as well as the extraterritorial U.S. jurisdiction in the event of criminal offenses committed by U.S. military personnel or contractors.
After the start of the special military operation the U.S.-Norwegian agreement was amended that provides the U.S. 8 additional military facilities: Andoya, Orland, and Bardufoss air bases, Haakonsvern naval base; Vaernes and Setermoen garrisons; Namsen fuel terminal; Osmurk cave complex (for supporting infrastructure). It is important to note that there have been U.S. military depots in Norway before. According to estimates published in 2019, the Orland and Vaernes bases alone had accumulated weapons and equipment for a Marine brigade deployment and autonomous operations for 30 days.
Military infrastructure created by the U.S. under the agreement is considered Norwegian property, but the U.S. can use it as long as necessary. The Norwegian interest is that the accumulated U.S. weapons and property can then be transferred or sold to Norway.
The agreement does not provide for effective control in the event of the use of force by U.S. troops (in particular, against Russia): it talks about coordination, but does not specify the mechanism and participants of such actions. It turns out that Norway may be involved in a military conflict against its will.
During 2023, agreements with Finland, Sweden and Denmark were signed under exactly the same scenario. The U.S. received unlimited access to various military facilities: 17 in Sweden [Agreement of Defense Cooperation Between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of the United States of America. Available at: Government.se (accessed: 06.04.2024)] and 15 in Finland [Agreement of Defense Cooperation Between the Government of the Republic Finland and the Government of the United States of America. Available at: Finlandabroad.fi (accessed: 02.04.2024)] (warehouses, ranges, training centers, air bases, ports), as well as 3 air bases in Denmark [Agreement of Defense Cooperation Between the Government of Denmark and the Government of the United States of America. Available at: Via.Ritzau.dk (accessed: 02.04.2024)]. According to the texts of the agreements, Norway and Denmark did not explicitly authorize the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons on their territories, while Finland and Sweden remained silent on this issue. But Finnish President A. Stubb allowed nuclear weapons to be moved across the territory “in case of necessity.” He also made a reservation that the final decision on the deploying nuclear weapons rests with the government and parliament.
Since the above military facilities can be used for NATO exercises, a flexible mechanism emerges that gives the U.S. with the ability, virtually unchecked by the Nordic countries, to use military force both through bilateral treaties or within NATO. By signing security cooperation agreements in 2021-2023, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland have become hostages to U.S. foreign policy. The logical complement of vassal relations with the U.S. was Sweden's and Finland's joining to NATO in 2023-2024. As a result, Russia gained more than a thousand kilometers of direct border with NATO at the expense of Finland. Additionally, the risks to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (two-thirds of which were traditionally located on the Kola Peninsula), as well as for industrial facilities in the Murmansk and Leningrad regions, have increased significantly.
Based on the consolidation achieved between the U.S. and its allies, a common planning and command-and-control space is being formed linking the Arctic and the Baltic regions. A rapid deployment force or other joint NATO units focused on the Arctic can be easy created. For example, a joint Norway-Sweden-Finland-Denmark air group has been announced that could target both the Kola Peninsula and the Northern Sea Route. It will consist of 250 fighters that will operate in accordance with NATO concepts for joint operations.
Norway is assigned the role of NATO's main pillar in the Arctic both because of its strategic position (access to the Arctic Ocean, proximity to Russia's nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula, the possibility of rapid transfer of NATO forces) and because of the presence of large combat-ready Arctic forces (Brigade Nord). The U.S. began to seriously address the latter task only in 2022, sending its soldiers to Norway for training and experience. In 2024, Norway increased military spending by 20% and will bring the level of military spending to 2% of GDP. As early as 2012, Norway's armed forces began purchasing the latest weapons, including frigates with missile defense systems, missile boats, submarines, armored vehicles, and replacing F-16s with F-35s. The number of F-35s should reach 50 by 2024. The Norwegian Navy is ready to support NATO operations in the adjacent seas, but lacks ice-class ships. An analysis of ongoing exercises shows that NATO is practicing naval operations toward Svalbard and further toward the Barents Sea.
Apparently, the U.S. has prepared Finland to play the role of an advanced bridgehead for possible offensive actions against Russia. The Finnish army is considered to be highly capable and well-equipped. In line with this attitude, in 20224 Finland has increased its military budget by 36% to modernize its armed forces. The U.S. has approved the sale of David's Sling Ssurface-to-air systems, AIM-9X Block II air-to-air missiles for fighters, AGM-154 planned guided bombs, and modernization of M270 MLRS multiple launch rocket systems.
It can be assumed that at present the main emphasis in the development of Finland's strike capability is on the development of the Air Force. The F-35A models delivered to Finland are capable of carrying the B-61 nuclear bomb on board, which creates conditions for launching a program for joint use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. and Finland. However, this will take time, as it is necessary to create the appropriate infrastructure on Finnish territory and overcome the resistance of public opinion. It should be added that the network of airfields in Finland alone is twice as large as the comparable number of airfields in the Leningrad, Karelia, and Murmansk regions.
It is highly likely that elements of the U.S./NATO missile defense systems based on Patriot and David's Sling will appear on the territory of Finland and Sweden and will be integrated into a unified control system. This will make it possible to combine the capabilities of missile defense elements in the Baltic and Arctic regions, especially since Finland and Estonia have signed an agreement on the integration of coastal defense systems. The U.S. is also exploring the possibility of integrating missile defense with the F-35, which will use its radars to help guide anti-missile missiles from a farther distance and potentially detect ballistic missile launches from Russian territory.
The nature, scale and scenario of NATO's exercises in the Arctic also demonstrate intentions for future offensive actions, and this trend appeared also before the special military operation in Ukraine. Since 2018, 4 of the 7 largest NATO exercises have been conducted in the Arctic:
The last of these exercises, Steadfast Defender 24, was held from February 1 to May 31, 2024 with the participation of all NATO countries. The main purpose was to practice responding to a possible Russian attack on NATO's eastern flank. While before the scenario involved an abstract unfriendly state, now the exercise openly demonstrates the enemy - Russia.
The exercises took place in all domains: space, air, land, sea and cyberspace. The initial phase practiced the transport of significant forces from the U.S. and Canada to Europe and landing from the sea on the coasts of the Arctic states. At the second stage, multi-domain interoperability was practiced on the territory of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary. At the same time, NATO exercises were accompanied by national maneuvers, in accordance with the specifics of potential threats. The Steadfast Defender 24 exercise involved more than 50 ships (from destroyers to aircraft carriers); more than 80 fighters, helicopters and drones; 133 tanks and 533 armored vehicles. This way NATO has returned to Cold War deterrence.
The strategic environment in the Arctic has significantly deteriorated due to the final polarization: Russia versus NATO states. The situation is aggravated by the fact that formerly neutral Finland and Sweden have adopted the most radical anti-Russian positions.
The U.S. and NATO have adopted a course of militarization of the Arctic for a long time. This is confirmed by the military modernization programs of Finland, Norway and other countries, which are designed for at least 10 years.
NATO’s overall military potencial in the Arctic is significantly superior to Russia's. However, there are also significant shortcomings that limit its functionality and reduce its real effectiveness: a small number of icebreakers and ice-class warships; insufficient experience in Arctic operations; the lack of adaptation of many weapons systems to Arctic conditions; insufficient coverage of the Arctic with space communications (compared to Russia). At the same time, all Arctic states are investing significant funds in modernizing Arctic troops, technologies, equipment, and weapons.
After accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO the main threats to Russia's military security in the Arctic include:
The strategic environment in the Arctic demonstrates not only growing risks of military escalation, but also increasing uncertainty. The trend towards stabilization will emerge after the completion of global rebalancing and the reorganization of the world order on new “post-Western” principles.
Valery Konyshev
Saint-Petersburg State University
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