The new Department of Defense Arctic strategy of the U.S., published in July 2024 updated a previous document developed back under the administration of Republican Donald Trump in 2019. The new military strategy prompts a number of questions: to what extent it helps to solve accumulated problems? What is the fundamental novelty of this strategy? What challenges it creates for Russia's security in the High North?
Donald Trump's military strategy for the Arctic region included two key concepts. First, while acknowledging the relatively low probability of military escalation, the Arctic was identified as a potential region of U.S. strategic rivalry with Russia and China. Second, the text of the strategy noted that the U.S. believes it is feasible to use NATO forces in the Arctic to deter potential aggressors.
Trump's Arctic military strategy has been reduced to declarative statements about potential future threats, the need to increase combat readiness, renew the icebreaker fleet, and expand operations. The text of the strategy did not mention Ukraine as a factor influencing the aggravation of rivalry in Arctic politics. At the expert level, however, the idea has floated that Russia could repeat the success of reunification of Crimea with Russia in 2014 in the Baltic and Arctic regions. In general, the role of the Arctic in the Trump administration's system of foreign policy priorities has been relatively low.
Despite criticism of many of Trump's foreign policy initiatives, the Biden administration nevertheless continued to develop the trend of confrontation in the Arctic. The Arctic problems were directly linked to Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, a course was taken to force Finland and Sweden to join NATO, it was announced that NATO countries' interests in the region would be protected and that Russia and China's activities in the Arctic would be hostile to the West. Biden's Arctic military strategy was intended to present a more concrete and practical vision of the US military policy in conditions when the Arctic has finally lost its status as a "zone of peace and cooperation".
The document is structured into three sections: analysis of U.S. security interests in Arctic, description of the strategic environment, and measures to respond to new security challenges.
The 2024 Military Strategy identifies the development of infrastructure and the US/NATO military presence in the region as the foundation for regional stability. It also delineates new priorities.
Primarily, the United States is actually bringing the Arctic into NATO's area of responsibility. The mention of the Arctic states in the text of the strategy is consistently accompanied by a reference to their membership in NATO, underscoring the alliance's commitment to ensuring the collective security of its sovereign member states.
Secondly, the joint of Sweden and Finland to NATO considerably enhances the United States' strategic capabilities:
In general, the new strategy continues the long-term U.S. policy of pursuing global dominance. However, while under Barak Obama presidency China was considered a rival, under Trump administration it has been categorized as a "revisionist" power that represents a threat to U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Biden's military strategy continues the approach initiated by Trump with a focus on linking the Arctic with the Indo-Pacific region. This strategy is designed to confront China on a global scale.
It is of particular significance that the projection of power into the European part of the Arctic is supported by a series of U.S. bilateral security treaties with Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, which were signed on the eve of the strategy's release (during 2023-24). Under the terms of these treaties, which are largely similar in content, the U.S. has been granted access to military bases located within the territories of these states. Furthermore, the U.S. has been afforded the right to place equipment, weapons, and warehouses within these bases at its discretion. Additionally, the U.S. is permitted to conduct exercises in various formats. In this manner, the U.S. military presence in the vicinity of Russia's Arctic borders becomes a flexible and guaranteed mechanism, either through NATO or through bilateral security treaties with the Arctic states.
The U.S. military strategy identifies the global challenge posed by China as the most serious problem. In the view of the U.S., all of China's research and economic activities are dual-use, including the testing of underwater robots, the adaptation of aviation to polar conditions, and the implementation of the Polar Silk Road transportation project. In the same spirit, the strategy evaluates the signed memorandum of understanding on shipping issues between the People’s Republic of China Coast Guard and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
The U.S. Department of Defense strategy also sees China's economic cooperation with the Arctic states as a potential threat. China's concept of a "global commons" in relation to Arctic resources and the Polar Silk Road serve as a cover for Beijing's aspirations to exert control over the Arctic.
The strategy indicates that with regard to Russia, the U.S. has benefited from the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. This is the expansion of a permanent military presence in the European part of the Arctic as well as a more reliable protection of the Faroe-Icelandic frontier. However, Russia has demonstrated the capacity to modernize and effectively utilize conventional forces, the nuclear triad, and special operations forces, thereby creating risks for the U.S. and its allies in the future.
The text of the strategy notes that Russia's provocative actions create threats to U.S. security interests. These actions include suppression of GPS signals, allegedly "unprofessional" interception of Western military aircraft near Russia's Arctic borders, and Russia's allegedly "unlawful ambitions" to restrict free navigation along the Northern Sea Route, which allegedly contradict the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The content of these U.S. arguments looks very controversial as suggested by Russian experts many times. Nevertheless, the deployment of these arguments in the analyzed document suggests an intention to pursue an offensive policy in the near future that would negatively impact Russia's legal rights in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation.
It is noteworthy that the text of the strategy does not provide any specific indications regarding potential threats from China or the Russia. The text makes no mention of strategies, military construction, potential, operational capabilities, the nature of the exercises being conducted, inter-state contradictions in the Arctic that could potentially lead to military conflicts involving Russia. The text of the U.S. strategy does not present Russia with anything other than "low-level destabilizing activity".
In the same spirit of uncertainty, Iris Ferguson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Arctic Policy, commented shortly before the release of the military strategy: "...they [the Russians] are doing this partly for economic purposes. But when we look at things, it is when their potentially defensive investments could have offensive capabilities. We are keeping a close eye on some of the investments they are making in the Arctic region".
Biden's military strategy cites China's intention to increase its influence on Arctic policy-making and several military maneuvers in the Arctic with Russia's participation as a threat to U.S. security. However, the U.S. Department of Defense, for example, has officially stated that the joint flights of Russian and Chinese fighter jets in Alaska do not pose a real threat because they do not violate international law in any way. Commenting on the text of the strategy, foreign experts note that nothing in China's actions in the Arctic indicates military preparations, and in this sense the text of the strategy also looks ideologically biased when it attributes military threats to the U.S. from China. Thus, both the text of the strategy and comments of American military make it clear that military threats to U.S. security in the Arctic are far-fetched.
Climate change has ambiguous implications for U.S. military strategy in the region. On the one hand, infrastructure is threatened; on the other, melting ice increases the economic and military importance of the Barents, Chukchi, Bering, and Bering seas. By 2030, the Arctic is expected to have significantly increased opportunities for maritime transit and seabed resource development, with all the risks that entails.
The most significant part of the analyzed document is devoted to how the U.S. intends to secure its interests in the Arctic.
The first direction is related to the development of systems for monitoring the operational environment and reconnaissance of enemy actions in the interests of Arctic Joint Force designed to carry out a wide range of military and non-military missions. Harsh weather and complex geomagnetic conditions present challenges to the high-tech Joint Force.
Special attention will be given to building the satellite constellation to ensure persistent communications and improve early warning of missile attacks. U.S. cooperation with Norway is underway in this area. According to the strategy, the intelligence system should be based on the continued modernization of the U.S.-Canadian NORAD system, which combines air and missile defense functions, as well as radars installed in the Nordic countries.
Another NORAD function to be developed is maritime surveillance. In addition, the Defense Department will invest in unmanned aerial vehicle projects. The plan is to share data between land, sea, air, and space-based platforms located not only in the U.S. and Canada, but also in the European Arctic states.
There is also a military-scientific mission to reliably predict weather conditions by modeling processes in the ocean, atmosphere, and ionosphere. Such studies and models require an ongoing flow of data, including from sensors distributed over large areas of the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation. The blocking of international scientific cooperation with the Russia in the Arctic on the initiative of the West has made these data inaccessible to Western scientists. As result, the models will not be reliable enough. In this respect, the task set in the Department of Defense strategy remains far from an effective solution.
The second approach of implementation of the U.S. military strategy in the Arctic is related to the engagement of NATO structures. In effect, this means including the Arctic in NATO's area of responsibility. The strategy states that the U.S. will support NATO's plans to develop concepts for Alliance operations in the Arctic. The Arctic and Global Resilience Office be established in 2022 for coordination with different partners. The U.S. strategy also calls for continued joint training of special operations forces, both through bilateral military cooperation and through NATO. On domestic level National Guard and Coast Guard forces will be included in training programs for Arctic operations.
The U.S. Joint Force in Alaska can be reinforced on a rotational basis as needed. The force is designed to operate not only in the Arctic, but anywhere in the world, interacting with NATO allies as needed. The Joint Force will conduct maritime patrols in the Arctic, including the Faroe-Icelandic frontier, patrols in Icelandic airspace, and provide deployment operations for U.S. and NATO forces in the Arctic states. Obviously, Finland and Norway will be of primary interest.
The third approach of the strategy's implementation is to ensure military presence in the Arctic through independent and joint exercises, patrols, and the permanent deployment of Joint Force in Alaska, which form the first line of deterrence against the enemy. The strategy calls for further increasing the intensity of exercises in the Arctic, including the most important ones for the Department of Defense: Arctic Edge, Northern Edge, Ice Camp, Nanook, Noble Defender, Vigiland Shield, Nordic Response, Dynamic Mongoose, and Arctic Challenge.
The scenario of these exercises is aimed at practicing (a ) the deployment of U.S./NATO forces from the North America and Europe to Russian borders, and (b) offensive operations against Russia in all domains. In addition, the Arctic exercises are combined with the other exercises along the entire western border of Russia. For example, in 2024, they were part of Steadfast Defender, a January-June exercise involving 90,000 troops from 31 NATO countries - the largest exercise since the Cold War.
The United States has gained a substantial geopolitical advantage through the establishment of a guaranteed military presence in Finland and Sweden. Specific plans for the establishment of U.S./NATO infrastructure and military presence in the Arctic can be seen as a response to far-fetched threats that have been postulated to potentially emanate from Russia and China.
It would appear that there is still no consensus within the Department of Defense and the U.S. expert community on the content of U.S. military policy in the Arctic. This is largely due to a reluctance to engage in military escalation with Russia and an acknowledgment that there are insufficient resources to pursue a more offensive U.S. policy in the Arctic.
In fact, the United States has incorporated the Arctic into NATO area of responsibility. The formal announcement of this through the alliance itself remains a formality. With the expansion of the alliance to include Sweden and Finland, Russia's land border with NATO has increased to 1,500 km. The United States views this expansion as a means of strengthening its global dominance and as a means of deterring Russia and China in the Arctic.
In the perspective of the year 2030, the new strategy is designed to facilitate a gradual expansion of the U.S. military infrastructure in Alaska and Northern Europe. Additionally, it aims to enhance the operational experience in the North American and European Arctic regions. Furthermore, the strategy seeks to augment the frequency and duration of military exercises with an anti-Russian orientation, including the deployment and offensive elements.
It is of paramount importance to Russia's security to ascertain the depth of military cooperation between Finland and the U.S. The permanent military presence of the U.S. and NATO on Finnish territory creates significant threat to Russia's national security. In addition to the potential for attack on Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal on the Kola Peninsula, there is also a heightened risk of assault on densely populated industrial areas and military-industrial complex enterprises situated not only in the northwest but also in the central regions of Russia. The increased risk of military conflict in the Arctic jeopardizes Russia's survival and needs an appropriate response, possibly nuclear.
It is unlikely that the U.S. military strategy in the Arctic will give rise to significant disagreements between Republicans and Democrats following the November 2024 presidential elections, regardless of the outcome of the vote. The only limiting factor will be the budgetary capacity of the new U.S. administration. Sure, the U.S. will endeavor to redirect a considerable military expenditures to European countries, particularly NATO-newcomers, such as Finland and Sweden. But it is only a part of an "Arctic budget".
On the whole, Biden's new military strategy has not overcome the declarative nature of Trump's strategy, but the hegemonic ambitions have continued. Obviously, the refinement of the U.S. military strategy in the Arctic and military budget will take place, if at all, after the U.S. domestic consensus on the election results is reached. Otherwise, there will remain a significant gap between the ambitious U.S. military plans and reality.
Valery Konyshev
Saint-Petersburg State University
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