Since 1945, the US has pursued a grand strategy that prioritizes building and maintaining its unrivaled network of allies and partners. This approach was temporarily replaced during the Trump administration with its “America first” policy, which adopted a more questioning and confrontational tone. However, since President Biden took office in 2021, the United States has reverted to a more traditional approach, emphasizing the importance of alliances and efforts to deepen and expand them. The 2022 National Defense Strategy and the 2024 Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy for the Arctic consider the U.S. friends a "center of gravity," indeed, a term in military planning jargon, thus embedding American national security interests on “globe-spanning network of alliances and partnerships”. The point is that these documents articulate the security cooperation entails formal alliances, multilateral coalitions, and military-to-military engagements among nation-states.
The Arctic region, which has become an increasing focus in U.S. defense planning, is viewed as a potential flashpoint for military confrontation between Moscow and the U.S. and its NATO allies. At the same time, considering the possibility of conflict to be quite realistic, the Americans are implementing their Arctic strategy as a deterrent primarily to China, which can take advantage of Russia's current vulnerabilities and proceed to action.
Against this background, the enhanced Russian military capabilities and alleged threats of Russian invasion (if not today, then tomorrow) serve as a rationale not as much for the American, but for the European citizens to spend their taxes invest in defense as a European public good, thus increasing military expenditure share in national GDP. But still there is a general understanding that EU defense policy decisions would then anyhow be subordinated to NATO decisions. In this nexus, there are at least three explicit examples of bilateral and trilateral military-to-military engagements in the Northern European and Arctic contexts, showcasing the willingness of the Europeans to lend a hand to the Atlanticists.
First, the issue of the US lagging behind in icebreakers is a long-standing concern for American politicians and policymakers. Perhaps only the lazy have not written about the plans of the “big three”, known as ICE Pact, to build 70–90 icebreakers, which, according to Western researchers, will be needed to equalize opportunities with Russia. ICE Pact is somewhat reminiscent of AUKUS, aimed to build nuclear submarines for Australia. “Only this time we are in the role of Australians,” said Dr. Rebecca Pincus of the United States, Director of the Polar Institute at the Wilson Center. Interestingly, the American think-tanks are attempting to persuade the government that the recipe for success is not to build the icebreakers’ fleet, even if vessels are desirable and in demand. They are proposing to turn Russian Arctic oil and gas reserves and infrastructure in unprofitable, loss-making assets. At the same time, despite the numerous allegations in the media that the U.S. lags far behind Russia in weapons in the Arctic and its decrepit ice-breaking fleet is uncapable to fully operate in the Arctic conditions, most of 53 American nuclear attack submarines (SSNs, not the Ballistic Missile Submarines) are known to be able to operate deep undersea and break through the ice from below. They regularly transit under the Arctic ice or break through the ice and surface near the North Pole since 1958. So, for more than 60 years, the U.S. Submarine Force has completed 99 Ice Exercises in the Arctic region in support of inter-fleet transit, training, cooperative allied engagements and operations. In march 2024, the 99th three-week Ice Camp mission was conducted in the dense ice of the Beaufort Sea. In addition to U.S. Navy, Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Space Force participation in the exercise, personnel from the Royal Canadian Air Force, Royal Canadian Navy, the French Navy, the United Kingdom Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy were participating.
History always demonstrates that peace comes through strength. ICE CAMP and other Joint and International evolutions will help sustain our Navy’s continued proficiency in the Arctic while maintaining an enhanced presence, strengthening cooperative partnerships and building a more capable Arctic force,
stated Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and naval component commander, U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command
Two Navy attack submarines, the Hampton, right, and the Indiana, broach the ice in the frozen Beaufort Sea. Source: The New York Times
In addition to SSNs, the US has 14 nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), each capable of carrying 24 inter-continental range ballistic missiles, and 4 Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN), but they do not patrol in the Arctic. All in all, the American submarine capabilities account for 71 vessels. In comparison, Russia’s fleet consists of 64 submarines, including 16 SSBNs, 14 SSNs, as well as 11 nuclear cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) and 223 diesel-electric attack submarines (SSKs). As for American heavy icebreakers’ construction programs, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard have envisaged the Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program, with the procurement cost of three PSCs about $5.1 billion. Yet the outcome that the U.S. Coast Guard is experiencing on its highest priority programs has fallen far short of expectations.
The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recently published key recommendations as soon as revealed that the Coast Guard’s performance reports for the Arctic region contained incomplete or unavailable information for 2016-2021 fiscal years, plus reports were unavailable for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. GAO has recommended that the US Coast Guard take steps to improve its collection and reporting of complete information about resource use and mission performance in the Arctic region, and its Arctic implementation plan should include performance measures with associated targets and timeframes for action items.
Coast Guard District 17 Area of Operations. Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office
Additionally, U.S. government-sponsored research activity in Arctic waters has a long history of dual-purpose use. The federal government spent over $550 million on Arctic research in fiscal year 2023. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Science Foundation, and the Department of Defense are the agencies with the three largest Arctic budgets, which account for over 80% of the fiscal year 2023 total. Based on agency summaries, NSF invests primarily in basic research, DoD invests primarily in applied research, and NASA invests primarily in research infrastructure.
Arctic Research Funding by Agency, fiscal years 2022-2024. Source: Congressional Research Service
Giving the examples, the Arctic research plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. Navy operations, particularly in submarine warfare. Regular conductivity, temperature, and depth (CTD) data is essential to sonar operations, which is why the US Navy has been involved in Arctic research activities for many years. For instance, US Coast Guard's icebreaker, Healy, has been involved in numerous Arctic research missions, including the deployment of sea surface and weather sensors, as well as the collection of CTD data for the US Navy's Arctic Mobile Observing System, alongside Canada, Norway, and Denmark. The Naval military say that strength of the U.S. Sea Services lies not just in their warfighting capabilities or technological advances, but also in the ways they embrace the U.S. rich diversity of knowledge.
A US Navy ocean glider type unmanned undersea vehicle, commonly used for underwater survey purposes. Concept art associated with the AMOS programs suggests these could be adapted to Arctic conditions. Source: The War Zone
With an official aim to service the Nansen and Amundsen Basins Observational System (NABOS), the Healy indeed was picking up 9 mooring buoys that have been placed in international waters but in close proximity to Russian EEZ in Chukchi Sea since 2021, so the data on them can be downloaded and studied. The buoys are to be replaced by new ones. The map depicts the place where Russian research vessel Akademik Nemchinov intercepted Healy in August 2023, near Buoy 9. From there Healy headed northeast to service buoys 8 and 7. After buoy 7 the vessel turned west north to service the remaining buoys (6-1) that are arrayed in an arc from east to west.
NABOS. Source: The Maritime Executive
Second, the US northern allies are involved in NATO's plan to disperse weapons production bases across all potential theatres of military operations, from the Arctic region to the Indo-Pacific.
These days NATO is moving troops into Northern Finland, where at least Swedish and Norwegian soldiers are arriving. Finnish Defense Minister Antti Häkkänen is hesitant to tell about the location of the base while Swedish Defense Minister Pål Jonson still does not provide details about the numbers of troops or personnel, for example. Despite pressing inconsistencies between foreign policy decisions and national legislation, including national constitutions, Finland and Sweden have granted US military unrestricted access to the air, sea and land infrastructure facilities, 15 and 17 sites respectively, while Denmark has designated 3 and Norway 12 sites, meeting the demands of the American doctrine based on military unpredictability as an essential part of the military strategy.
Likewise, the US is preparing for a proxy conflict in Indo-Pacific through engagement of allies in military build-up. Aiming to contain China, Norway was the first among the Nordic states to gain an interest in formation of NATO’s Asian arm in the Indo-Pacific alongside with US, French, German, British and South Korean leading military-industrial companies. So, with an agreement by Kongsberg Defense and Aerospace with Australian Government, for the first time, production of the Norwegian Joint Strike Missile (JSM) and the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) has been established outside of Kongsberg.
Third, as for arms trade, most relevant to the Arctic is foreign military sales (FMS) and concomitant export controls, which were added to the security cooperation toolkit with the passage of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The act's framework has evolved since then to ensure that such sales align with U.S. foreign policy and national security interests.
In the Arctic region, the historical inefficiencies in the U.S. transfer of defense articles and services to its allies and partners is a pressing concern due to increased geopolitical competition, as noted, among the U.S., Russia, and China. It is increasingly recognized that FMS process, which takes on average 18 months, as well as U.S. export controls undermine the ability of America’s allies to deploy and maintain forces at readiness. In June 2023, the U.S. DoD acknowledged this problem and approved recommendations to improve institutional processes to execute FMS cases. U.S. arms sales and military cooperation in the region focus on bolstering the defense capabilities of its allies, which share Arctic interests and seek to counterbalance Russian presence in the region.
A definite gain for the US is the supply of F-35 fighters to the Northern Europeans (up to 250 machines in total are expected by 2030), with the exception of the Swedes, who have their own domestic aircraft. Despite various disagreements over the F-35's combat capabilities and its extremely high cost to European taxpayers, the aircraft could be big Pentagon success story. Among other things, the U.S. values the F-35 aircraft integration into the Multi-Domain Advanced Data Link (MADL), enabling F-35s from various nations to exchange information and coordinate actions. Military analyst Robbin Laird emphasizes that this capability is particularly significant in the European theater in the event of military conflict, as F-35s from Norway, Finland, Denmark, the UK, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, and Romania can collaborate effectively to establish a common operational picture.
Other success story is the development and use of unmanned vehicles and remote sensing technologies in the Arctic region. The IDG consortium is a notable example of international cooperation in this area, bringing together nations and organizations, including Norway’s Andøya Space Center, Boeing’s drone company Insitu, Canadian R&D corporation C-Core, Danish MDSI company, as well as Scott Polar Research Institute (UK), Viasat (US) and VTT (Finland), to create the Integrated Remote Sensing for the Arctic (IRSA) architecture. The IRSA system is designed for monitoring and reconnaissance in the Arctic, utilizing a combination of four different types of platforms, including drones, satellites, aircraft, and underwater vehicles.
The rest is that, for years, Nordic Defense Staff and U.S. European Command have long been mutual members of the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable (ASFR), a flag-and-general-officer level, military-to-military forum designed to enhance multilateral security cooperation in the Arctic. In 2024, the forum was held in Swedish Kiruna, which is home to the Esrange Space Center, a rocket range and space research center important to military and scientific applications. Among other things, the participants examined the socio-economic aspects of the region as they toured the LKAB mine, which supplies around 85% of all iron ore to the European Union. During WWII most of the ore mined in Kiruna was transported to the Nazi Germany.
Yet just as the US wants its friends to rally behind efforts to compete with China and provide support to Ukraine, northern allies are concerned about potential deployment of foreign reinforcements to the High North and the ability to ensure a continuous flow of supplies in the event of warfare. While pre-storing equipment and supplies in northern Finland or northern Sweden may be possible, the majority of the equipment needed to reinforce the High North will have to be transported by sea to the area of operations. This will require identifying suitable reception areas for sea-transported reinforcements. Narvik in northern Norway is one such area, as it has protected land connections through Swedish Lapland. Other potential reception areas include Trondheim and Swedish ports on the West Coast, i.e. Gothenburg. In addition, Norway as a key regional actor alongside the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States are expected to participate in operations in the North Sea and the Norwegian Sea. Deputy Commander of the Joint Arctic Command, Brigadier General Poul Primdahl (Denmark), noted that the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap also holds significant strategic importance for NATO to ensure regional security.
This is the route through which we would achieve reinforcement from North America in a conflict scenario within Europe. Consequently, Arctic security emerges as a priority for NATO and its allies. The area under our responsibility is poised to experience increased utilization by global actors, including in trade, shipping, research, and tourism. This influx will inevitably present challenges, both in terms of surveillance and search and rescue operations. We need to be capable to handle that
noted Brigadier General Poul Primdahl
BG Poul Primdahl. Source: Military Times
The U.S. Navy Commander Joshua Fischer, Director of Supplier Operations at Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy Europe and Africa, emphasized that the ability to support expansion into the northern regions of the theater represents a steppingstone in allies’ power projection capabilities in the Arctic. DLA Energy Europe and Africa, in collaboration with EUCOM and U.S. Naval Forces Europe, is committed to enhancing support capabilities, thereby enabling warfighters to reach the most remote areas of the theater.
Endeavors such as this will lay the groundwork for future mission success in the High North and Arctic as our Navy expands into more northern operations to deter potential adversaries who might attempt to hinder access or impede freedom of navigation or disrupt commerce
Comd. Joshua Fischer stated
DLA Energy Europe and Africa’s geographic responsibility extends 500 miles off the U.S. Atlantic coast to the Russian Pacific coast, comprising two-thirds of the Earth’s coastlines and spans 18 time zones.
By offering security guarantees, including against alleged threats from Moscow to the Northern European countries, especially Finland and Sweden, Poland, and the Baltic states, which has constituted a primary rationale for NATO's expansion over the past thirty years, the Americans have the opportunity to exert direct influence over regional security regimes and complicate the resolution of national security issues for states beyond their sphere of influence. This situation aligns precisely with the scenario articulated by Zbigniew Brzezinski, who referred to dependent countries as "tributaries" or "vassals." These nations receive numerous guarantees from the metropolitan power while simultaneously forfeiting their independence, including in the resolution of both internal and external issues.
So far, America's network of friends is unparalleled and serves as a crucial advantage in strategic competition in the economically attractive region. Most often the work is done through security escalation discourse and a diverse toolkit, like "ice" pacts, binding consortiums, numerous promises and pledges regarding security commitments, but only for the sake of protecting American interests on the European boarders. However, as the findings of this short analysis show, without significant reforms in information sharing, export and technology controls, and collaborative strategic planning, the "Allies & Partners" aspect of the national defense strategy risks remaining merely a "bumper sticker" slogan. To achieve a more effective "Allies & Partners" strategy in the Arctic, it's essential to move beyond words and focus on building trust, improving communication, and developing a shared vision for cooperation in the region.
The Editorial Board of the Arctic Century
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