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Commentary: “Arctic Window of Opportunities” for the United States

 

In an interview published by the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), Prof. Dmitry Danilov, Candidate of Political Sciences and Head of the European Security Department at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, addresses the pressing question of NATO’s presence in the Arctic.

Photo by Flickr / NATO

Danilov emphasises that NATO, as an intergovernmental alliance, does not yet operate as a cohesive actor in the Arctic. In response to a question about whether NATO functions as a bloc or as a combination of Arctic states, Prof. Danilov explains that the U.S. is not interested in a system of collective defence in the region, as it is not deemed beneficial.

Any expansion of the competencies of international organisations in this area is viewed as unwelcome competition by the North American member states of the Alliance.

Decisions within the alliance are made by consensus, which remains challenging due to the divergent interests of its member states. NATO's involvement in the Arctic is largely shaped by national interests, particularly those of the U.S., which has significant strategic priorities in the region.

The expert notes that while NATO has not formally integrated Arctic issues into its strategic documents, the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept indirectly addresses Arctic concerns, particularly in the areas of energy and transport security. These concerns are especially pertinent as global shipping routes and energy infrastructure in the Arctic become increasingly critical. However, it is pointed out that NATO’s role remains more influential as a mechanism for the U.S. and other countries to shape the policies of non-member Arctic states rather than as a direct actor in the region itself.

It seems to me that the U.S. is creating a kind of “window of opportunities” so that, if necessary and if it has its own serious motivation and new resources related to strengthening NATO’s northern flank, it can use the organisation precisely as an organisation so that NATO can be useful and, I would say, involved in the implementation of the new American Arctic strategy.

Professor adds:

At the same time, <...> when exercises and even combat training take place, they are and have been conducted according to the formula of the host country inviting its allies to join the exercises. This should not be misleading. In the final exercises of March 2024, 90 thousand personnel from all 32 NATO member states participated, including Finland and Sweden. Therefore, this is a window of opportunity. It turns out to be a game of variable geometry: here we act as NATO, and here we act not as NATO. In this sense, the United States is now looking for opportunities for fine-tuning within the bloc in order to use it as a reliable tool in implementing its new strategic tasks.

Will anything change with Finland and Sweden joining the NATO ranks?

Prof. Danilov highlights that climate change will become one of the issues within NATO’s scope following the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Alliance.

Yes, certainly. [...] While not directly articulating its desire to raise questions about NATO's presence in the Arctic, the Alliance states that climate issues are now a very important agenda in terms of challenges.

According to the expert, the Alliance will have greater political opportunities to establish a foothold in the region, as the membership of Finland and Sweden revitalises the idea of collective defence in the Arctic.

The interview also explores territorial disputes between NATO members, such as the U.S. and Canada over the Beaufort Sea, and the ongoing contest between Denmark and Canada over Hans Island. These issues underscore the competitive and often contentious nature of Arctic geopolitics, which complicates NATO’s unified approach.

In conclusion, Prof. Danilov argues that NATO is unlikely to become a primary actor in Arctic affairs, with the national strategies of its member states taking precedence. However, he acknowledges the growing importance of the Arctic in global security, noting that NATO will continue to engage with the region through the interests of its individual members.

Listen to the Podcast (in Russian)

  • 1:42 — Whether NATO is present in the Arctic as a unified bloc or whether it would be more accurate to describe the policies of NATO countries in the region.
  • 2:45 — The issue of NATO's activities in the Arctic was first raised in the second half of the 2000s.
  • 4:58 — The United States and Canada were not interested in expanding the participation of international organisations in the Arctic agenda
  • 5:31 — To what extent is North America interested in collective defence in the North?
  • 6:41 — Factor of relations between Russia and the West
  • 8:11 — The end of the "reset" policy
  • 10:34 — The first significant attempts to analyse the possibilities of NATO expansion to the North made in 2016
  • 11:57 — The Trump administration's priorities in NATO have pushed the Arctic agenda aside
  • 13:17 — Accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO changed the situation
  • 13:54 — Climate issues brought the Arctic agenda to NATO
  • 14:38 — The accession process for Finland and Sweden started much earlier 2022
  • 15:32 — New NATO capabilities in the Arctic
  • 18:05 — The northern flank of Russia's deterrence system is being strengthened
  • 19:05 — About nukes 
  • 21:06 — Anti-access and anti-maneuver zones (A2/AD) — a deterrence and motivation 
  • 22:02 — The Arctic "window of opportunities" for the United States
  • 22:54 — About the new US Arctic strategy
  • 27:29 — The situation has changed: the United States seeks to have the ability to instrumentally use NATO to achieve strategic goals
  • 28:18 — How is Arctic policy documented within NATO?
  • 29:56 — How will the change in the Alliance's leadership affect the Arctic direction of NATO policy?
  • 30:28 — Mark Rutte is probably the only figure for NATO today
  • 33:06 — The High North will definitely be included in the NATO matrix of interests under Rutte
  • 35:13 — Rutte's "Northern Profile" is very noticeable

Source: Russian Council

20.11.2024