China’s strategic ambitions have increasingly turned towards the Arctic, a region rich in resources and political significance. This shift aligns with the Nation’s broader maritime aspirations, as articulated during the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held in Beijing from the 16th to the 22nd of October 2022. In his report to the Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping underscored, among other things, the importance of enhancing China’s maritime capabilities to safeguard national security and promote economic development.
This long-term vision reflects the growing recognition of the Arctic’s role in reshaping global dynamics. Melting ice caps are unveiling rich opportunities for resource extraction and shipping, notably the
Northern Sea Route. Recognising these prospects, China has sought to establish a presence in the region, engaging in scientific research, infrastructure development and diplomatic initiatives to secure its role as a major (quasi) Arctic stakeholder.
China’s approach to the Arctic is a mixture of political, economic and scientific objectives. The establishment of research stations, such as the Yellow River Station in Norway’s Svalbard archipelago, demonstrate Beijing’s intent to contribute to polar science while solidifying its presence in the Arctic. These stations have enabled Chinese researchers to conduct studies on climate change and Arctic ecosystems, further justifying their foothold in a traditionally exclusive region.
In 2013, China attained observer status in the Arctic Council, a significant milestone for a non-Arctic state. This status allows China to participate in discussions concerning Arctic governance, presenting itself as a cooperative partner while advancing its own strategic interests. Through this forum, Beijing has cultivated its image as a responsible stakeholder, possibly positioning itself to influence future policymaking in the region.
Cooperation with Russia represents another cornerstone of China’s Arctic strategy. The two countries have collaborated on the development of the Northern Sea Route (sometimes, perhaps daringly, referred to as the Ice Silk Road). This partnership not only aligns with China’s Belt and Road Initiative but also provides an alternative trade route to the Suez Canal, significantly reducing shipping times and costs between Asia and Europe. In addition to this logistical advantage, China has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure and resource extraction projects, seeking to access the region’s vast reserves of oil, gas and minerals.
But China’s Arctic ambitions extend beyond establishing its presence through research stations and observer status in the Arctic Council. One of the more significant aspects of its strategy is its efforts to leverage Norwegian expertise in Arctic technologies. Norway, as a prominent Arctic state, has developed advanced capabilities in deep-sea mining, offshore drilling and cold-weather resource extraction. These skills are critical for accessing the vast reserves of hydrocarbons and minerals hidden beneath the Arctic Ocean.
In particular, China has shown a keen interest in collaborations that could facilitate knowledge transfer. The China-Norway Marine University Consortium Alliance (CNMUCA), an academic partnership aimed at fostering cooperation between Norwegian and Chinese universities, exemplifies Beijing’s intent to integrate into Arctic scientific and technological networks. Although details of the consortium are not widely publicised, it is indicative of China’s methodical approach to enhancing its technical competencies through bilateral cooperation. Moreover, Chinese investments in Norwegian maritime industries signal a deeper alignment of economic interests. Through acquisitions and joint ventures, Beijing seeks to access technologies that would otherwise be unavailable domestically.
Finally, China’s launch of the Tan Suo San Hao icebreaking research vessel in the end of 2024 reflects its possible aspirations to engage Norway in joint Arctic expeditions. By demonstrating its commitment to scientific cooperation, Beijing aims to secure Norway’s endorsement for its activities in the region. Such partnerships not only provide access to valuable data but also support China’s claim as a responsible and capable Arctic stakeholder.
Beneath its scientific and economic initiatives lies a more ambitious goal: promoting a “Chinese model” of ocean governance. In the Arctic, China advocates for a governance model that accommodates non-Arctic states, such as itself, framing the region as a global commons rather than a domain exclusively controlled by Arctic Nations.
Central to this model is the concept of "win-win" cooperation, which underscores China’s push for multilateral frameworks that emphasise resource-sharing and collective development. However, critics could argue that this approach hides underlying strategic goals, including securing resource rights and extending political influence. By promoting its governance model, China seeks not only to legitimise its Arctic activities but also to counterbalance the overwhelming dominance of so-called Western powers in the region – this is due to the fact that, of the eight Arctic states, seven are “Western” nations and NATO members, Russia being then only one outside this bloc: institutionally, from a “one country, one vote” perspective, the Arctic is indeed overwhelmingly “Western”, regardless of population size, geographic area or maritime borders.
In parallel, China has employed soft-power initiatives to reinforce its vision of inclusive governance. Through cultural exchanges, public diplomacy campaigns and investments in Arctic states, Beijing has cultivated a narrative of mutual benefit and cooperation. However, this approach has faced resistance, particularly from the United States and its allies, who view China’s Arctic activities as part of a broader strategy to challenge “Western” hegemony.
China’s expanding involvement in the Arctic proves, once more, its aspirations to redefine its position on the global stage. Through scientific partnerships, infrastructure investments and diplomatic maneuvering, Beijing has firmly inserted itself within a region of immense strategic importance. These actions extend beyond resource extraction and logistical benefits, touching on broader themes of influence and governance.
By advocating for a governance framework that accommodates non-Arctic Nations, China is not only seeking inclusion but aiming to shape the rules of engagement to reflect its strategic interests. This approach challenges the dominance of established Arctic states and tests the boundaries of international cooperation. How China’s ambitions intersect with the sovereignty and priorities of Arctic Nations will play a defining role in the region’s evolution. The unfolding dynamics in this polar frontier deserve sustained attention from policymakers and observers worldwide.
Tommaso Bontempi
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