For a long time, after the 1980s, the Arctic region gained significance as an exceptional zone of peace, a region that bears no pretext for conflicts and may even become a sort of olive branch that, instead of generating conflicts, resolves them.
This has contributed to the image of the region that has reappeared under many names and concepts—mainly, Arctic exceptionalism, a term first coined likely by Oran Young and Gail Osherenko in their 1989 book The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities. The tendency, however, has changed and become so turbulent that the prevailing opinion connotes that the region continuously militarises and builds pressure. According to some experts, the 'New Arctic' has a sleeping conflictogène which is ready to break out—the region is highly prone to conflict, especially with the intensification of economic operations and politics in the North.
The Arctic discourse of the 20th century largely existed within the frames of the Cold War and followed the same patterns as global politics. Notably, the differences were so deeply rooted that they could be seen not just in the general political confrontation, but also at the topical level in Arctic fiction literature from the USSR and the US.
A new vision was created, founded on Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative in 1987, which in turn influenced the establishment of new organisations (the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Council) in the region. This major shift in the 1980s and 1990s could be observed even in the policies of states. For instance, Canada's Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, a conservative politician promoting sovereignty and military emphasis, proposed fostering peace and engagement on issues of common concern.
One of the key discussions of the 21st century is whether the Arctic will retain this peace-bringing status and whether countries will be able to adapt to the new political conditions, as the current, mostly Western, perception of the Arctic suggests constant confrontation, with Russia and China on one side and the West on the other, raising the question about NATO's presence in the Arctic as a bloc. This is also highly influenced by the weakness of regional institutions such as the Arctic Council.
One can notice that the same concept keeps reappearing in media and political dialogue. Even when the nature of politics is highly confrontational, as it is now, the Arctic's identity as an exceptional space in the world continues to elevate the same topics, bringing them to the forefront.
The American president-elect was believed to thrive on chaos in his Arctic policy during his previous term. On many levels, the former course could be easily distinguished from that of Trump's Democratic opponents—Barack Obama and Joe Biden. Nevertheless, this time, Trump's administration seems more invested in a straightforward Arctic policy.
A controversial publication by Lyle J. Goldstein made in December 2024 resonated with Russian media sources, as it suggested a simple idea—the Arctic can become an economic lever that could halt military operations in Ukraine.
Russia and China want to trade in the Northern Sea Route. Consider it a bargaining chip that could benefit the West, too.
—Lyle J. Goldstein
This idea was reprinted, placing special emphasis on the economic benefits for both sides of the 'bargain' and the possible way to finance the restoration of Ukrainian infrastructure—e.g. 5% of the Northern Sea Route's earnings.
With recent disregard for European countries, breaking news about the US's plans to buy Greenland, and a mild Russian response to this security issue, previous speculations certainly deserve closer inspection. Another interesting takeout is the return of the 'peaceful' rhetoric in the continuously building discourse of confrontation, this time likely coming from the states. To trace the story:
The Editorial Board of the Arctic Century
Also read the publication:
Towards Dialogue and Negotiations: Conflicting Narratives and the UN’s Potential Role in Ending the War in Ukraine
